Bangladesh Joins Tri-Nation Meeting with China & Pakistan

General Studies Paper-2

Context

• Bangladesh, China and Pakistan held an informal trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the 9th China-South Asia Exposition and the 6th China-South Asia Cooperation meeting in Kunming.

About the meeting

• The three countries exchanged views on the basis of mutual trust, understanding and shared vision for peace, prosperity and stability in the region, the release added.
• They identified key areas for cooperation including infrastructure, connectivity, trade, investment, healthcare, agriculture, maritime affairs, ICT, disaster preparedness, and climate change.

Why Are These Countries Coming Closer?

• China’s Strategic Interests:
  • BRI Expansion: China is deepening its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) footprint in South Asia by integrating regional players through infrastructure and trade projects.
  • Countering Indo-Pacific Strategy: The trilateral can be seen as an effort to balance the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia) and the Indo-Pacific security architecture.
• Pakistan’s Objectives:
  • Regional Isolation: Pakistan is facing regional diplomatic isolation and sees China as a steadfast ally.
  • Leverage in South Asia: Inclusion of Bangladesh helps Pakistan engage with another key South Asian player, diluting Indian influence.
• Bangladesh’s Calculated Hedging:
  • Balancing India and China: While traditionally close to India, Bangladesh is also seeking Chinese investment and infrastructure support to diversify its partnerships.
  • Economic Interests: China is Bangladesh’s top trading partner and a significant source of FDI, especially in energy and infrastructure.

Geopolitical Implications of the Trilateral Engagement

• Attempt at Creating a ‘Continental Bloc’: The trilateral could gradually evolve into a strategic bloc in South Asia with deep Chinese influence — running parallel to India-led initiatives like BIMSTEC and BBIN.
• China’s Maritime Ambitions: If the cooperation extends into Bay of Bengal maritime affairs, it would mark a significant Chinese foothold in India’s maritime backyard.
• Diminishing SAARC Relevance: With SAARC rendered ineffective due to India-Pakistan tensions, China is now attempting to craft a China-centric alternative regional format.
• Potential for Strategic Infrastructure: China’s port investments in Chittagong (Bangladesh) and Gwadar (Pakistan) could eventually support dual-use facilities, raising concerns about militarisation and encirclement of India.

Way Ahead

• Regional Multilateralism: India needs to proactively push sub-regional groupings like BIMSTEC, BBIN, and IORA as platforms for promoting regional connectivity and countering China-centric regional architectures.
• Recalibration of Neighbourhood Policy: A long-term strategic blueprint that includes predictable economic assistance, respect for smaller nations’ agency, and cooperative security mechanisms can help counter China’s transactional diplomacy.
• India must enhance its maritime domain awareness and naval diplomacy. Strengthening QUAD naval exercises, expanding Sagarmala and Project Mausam, and deepening ties with Indian Ocean littoral countries (like Seychelles, Mauritius, Indonesia) are vital.

Concluding remarks

• The informal alignment among China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh reflects China’s evolving strategy to reshape South Asia’s geopolitical architecture in its favour.
• India must respond with a balanced strategy that combines principled diplomacy, development-led partnerships, and robust security measures to preserve its leadership and promote regional stability.