A moment of reckoning for Aukus and Australia

General Studies Paper 2

Context:

An announcement about an “optimal pathway” for AUKUS is on the horizon. It has implications for Australia’s plans to operate a fleet of nuclear powered submarines within the next decade.

Importance of AUKUS for Australia:

• Focusingon Indo-Pacific
• Transferring Nuclear Submarines to Australia
• Australia is now set to join an elite group of only six countries – India, the US, the UK, France, Russia and China(that operate nuclear-powered submarines).
• Multi-Sectoral Cooperation-Meetings and engagements between the three countries and cooperation across emerging technologies (applied AI, quantum technologies and undersea capabilities).

Concerns for Australia:

• It requires a favorable path to develop deterrence capabilities against potential adversaries
  • even the most positive outcome of the AUKUS consultations is not without drawbacks.
• Many of its regional partners oppose the Royal Australian Navy operating nuclear attack submarines.
  • Such as Indonesia, have been open about their reservations.
  • India: being politically supportive of AUKUS, conflicted about the prospect of these submarines operating in the regional littorals.

Australian stand:

• AUKUS does not provide Australia with nuclear weapons capability, but is rather a means of acquiring nuclear maritime propulsion.
• Distinguished AUKUS from groups such as the Quad: It describes the Quad as a normative grouping that lays out a vision for the region and AUKUS as a more technical arrangement.

Options and challenges for Australia:

• The U.S. to build nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for Australia.
  • Challenges:
    • Many U.S. policymakers seem skeptical about this option.
    • Top U.S. Senators wrote to the President urging him not to sell nuclear submarines to Australia.
  • to expand its Astute-class programme to Australia: The U.K. is constructing its Dreadnought-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) programme while designing the Astute-class replacement in a sequential build process.
    • Challenge:
      • Even if Australia acquired an Astute-class submarine, integrating the onboard combat system would be difficult due to differences between the current Australian and American fleets.
    • Trilateral effort to develop a new nuclear submarine design: Australia could announce a modified version of the yet-to-be-launched
      • Next-Generation Attack Submarine or U.K. Submersible Ship Nuclear Replacement (SSNR) programmes
      • Or a completely new AUKUS-class design to be acquired by all three countries.
      • Challenge:
        • Australia has to figure out how to get around U.S. export controls.
        • The U.S.’s stringent export control and protocol regime could jeopardize the technology transfer agreement, particularly in areas related to undersea capabilities and electronic warfare.

Implications for India:

• The developments surrounding AUKUS are instructive for Indian observers.
• Acquiring nuclear propulsion technologyis likely to be also complicated for India, which is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
• The complexities involved in the transfer of technology for HEU-fuelled reactors in nuclear attack submarines from the U.S. and U.K., leave India with only one practical option: buying a high-power reactor from France.
• The miniaturized low-enriched uranium (LEU) reactor core for SSNs, though a workable alternative for India, would impose its own limitations in terms of Indian dependence on France for reactor fuel and the need for periodic refueling.

Way Forward

• AUKUS remains a military pact with the potential to shape the strategic contours of maritime Asia
• Reform the U.S. export control regime by creating a “carve-out” of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
• For India, which has never been in the same league of U.S. partners as Australia, acquiring critical technology from the U.S. remains a more daunting prospect.
• For Australia to operate nuclear-powered submarines with high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuelled reactors, it will have to exploit a loophole that allows non-nuclear weapon countries to withdraw the fissile material required for submarine reactors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)-monitored stockpile.
• The removal could set a dangerous precedent, allowing potential proliferators to use naval reactors as a cover for future nuclear weapons development.