India’s ‘return’ to Central Asia

Syllabus: General Studies Paper 2

Context

The inaugural India-Central Asia Summit, the India-Central Asia Dialogue, and the Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan in New Delhi — all held over the past four months — collectively indicate a renewed enthusiasm in New Delhi to engage the Central Asian region.

• India has limited economic and other stakes in the region, primarily due to lack of physical access.
• And yet, the region appears to have gained a great deal of significance in India’s strategic thinking over the years, particularly in the recent past.
• India’s mission Central Asia today reflects, and is responsive to, the new geopolitical, if not the geo-economic, realities in the region.
• More so, India’s renewed engagement of Central Asia is in the right direction for the simple reason that while the gains from an engagement of Central Asia may be minimal, the disadvantages of non-engagement could be costly in the longer run.

The driving factors of this Great power dynamics

• The decline of American presence and power in the broader region (due primarily to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan) has led to a reassertion by China and Russia seeking to fill the power vacuum. India’s engagement of Central Asia would also help it to consolidate its post-American Afghan policy.
• While China dominates the geo-economic landscape, Russia is the dominant politico-military power in the region.
• Geo-economics might gain more traction.
• A somewhat anxious Moscow considers India to be a useful partner in the region: it helps it to not only win back New Delhi, which is moving towards the U.S., but also to subtly checkmate the rising Chinese influence in its backyard.
• There are growing and legitimate concerns within the Indian strategic community that India in the region might get further hemmed in due to the combined efforts by China, Pakistan and Taliban-led Afghanistan. If so, it must ensure that there is no China-led strategic gang up with Pakistan and the Taliban against India in the region, which, if it becomes a reality, would severely damage Indian interests.

Focus on Afghanistan:

• S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has landed India in a major dilemma– it has very limited space to engage Taliban 2.0 despite the current relationship whose future depends on a number of variables.
• During the Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghanigovernments, given their proximity to India and the presence of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, India was able to engage Kabul without too much hardship, despite Pakistani resistance.
• Now that the Taliban have returned to Kabul,New Delhi is forced to devise new ways of engaging Afghanistan. That’s where the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and Russia could be helpful.
• For instance, given its location bordering Afghanistan as well as its close geographical proximity to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Tajikistanholds immense geopolitical significance for India (incidentally, India helps maintain an airbase in the country).

Russia’s role in current scenario

• President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the earlier meeting between Russian National Security Adviser General Nikolai Patrushev and Mr. Modi are indications of the growing relationship.
• A cursory glance at the various issues being discussed between the two sides also indicates a new joint thinking on regional security.
• By courting Russia— its traditional partner, also close to China and getting closer to Pakistan — to help it re-establish its presence in the Central Asian region, India is seeking to work with one of the region’s strongest powers and also potentially create a rift between China and Russia, to the extent possible.
• One has to wait and see how far India will innovate to engage CARs in pursuit of its interests in Afghanistan. The announcement of a Joint Working Group on Afghanistanduring the summit between India and the CARs is surely indicative of such interest.
• The two countries recently exchanged a ‘non-paper’on how to increase their joint engagement in Central Asia.
• Both India and the CARs use Russian defence equipment, and the non-paper has reportedly explored the possibility ofjoint Indo-Russian defence production in some of the existing Soviet-era defence facilities in the CARs to meet local and Indian demands.
• The non-paper also reportedly discussespotential trilateral defence exercises among India, Russia and the CARs.
• In any case, joint defence production by India and Russia has been on the rise and the CARs could play a key role in it. This growing India-Russia partnership also explains India’s non-critical stance on the developments in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

Challenges for India’s ‘return’ to Central Asia:

• Chinashares a land border with the region,
• It is already a major investor there. China is theregion’s most important economic partner, a reality that worries Russia and sharpens India’s relative irrelevance in the region.
• Iran: India’s best shot at reaching the CARs is by using a hybrid model – via sea to Chabaharand then by road/rail through Iran (and Afghanistan) to the CARs. So, for New Delhi, the ongoing re-negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (or the Iran nuclear deal) are of crucial importance. If there is a deal, it would bring Tehran back into the Western fold and away from China (and Russia), which will be favourable to India. While Iran getting close to the West is not preferred by Russia (but preferred by India), if and when it becomes a reality, India would be able to use it to its advantage and join Russia in engaging the CARs.
• India’s ongoing outreach to Iran and the now-postponed visit of the Iranian foreign minister to New Delhi help repair some of the damage done to the relationship over the years.

The Hindu link

https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/indias-return-to-central-asia/article38389346.ece

Question- India needs to be proactive in engaging with central Asia because its strategic importance and India’s economic and security concerns. Comment.